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Priests, prophets or sorcerers?
On intellectual elites and politics in modernizing Latin America1
The new states of America, originally Spanish, do need kings with the title of 'pres-
ident'." If 7 as Simón Bolivar ? puts it — presidents are kings, the intellectuals in pol-
itics might be priests at the court. But they can be protesting prophets, as well, or
sorcerers: magicians with knowledge of special spells to influence reality (or to be-
witch the public). Indeed, Max Weber's typology of the actors on the religious field
(Weber 1985: 259, 268; Bourdieu 1971) is helpful for the intellectual field as well.
In early times of independence many intellectuals, as Bolivar, were leading politi-
cians at the same time. For their task of nation-building they could count on the
somewhat stable basis of mestizaje (— a situation quite different from Africa). The
task developed in a twofold way: Externally, national identity was constructed by
boundary marking over against Europe. Internally, it relied upon a protagonist and
quasi hegemonic control of the state over social life — in difference to North Amer-
ica, where social relationships were much more embedded in civil contract and as-
sociation. (Strasser 2002) The internal quest for power remains unsolved through-
out history, since politics in Latin America do not primarily root in popular partici-
pation but in a strong state under changing charismatic caudillos.
Thus, the intellectual field is traditionally being caught in the fight between dif-
ferent parties for the domination of a strong state and the struggle over the con-
struction of cultural identity. 3 The latter is a two-front challenge: the relation to Eu-
rope/USA on one hand and a repressed indigenous past on the other. There is much
space for intellectual elites to stand as priests behind the altar of orthodox powers.
But they also can pronounce protest as heterodox prophets of the yet unknown. Or
they can work on alternative knowledge — "allodox" at a first glance — and provide
special services.
How did the intellectual field in Latin America develop under these conditions?
What are the present challenges? Where do the intellectuals stand today? Before
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these questions are being discussed along an historical survey, I will first outline
some theoretical considerations.
The intellectual field, or: what are intellectual elites?
Priests, prophets and sorcerers, what do they have to do with intellectual elites? Are
intellectual elites social elites who are intellectual? Or are they elites among the in-
tellectuals? What are elites and what are intellectuals?
One way to approach the intellectual field is to distinguish its ideal-typical po-
sitions, similar (not completely alike) to the religious field. Bourdieu (1971) propos-
es — following Max Weber — four ideal types of religious actors: the public ("laics"),
the priests, the prophets, and the sorcerers. Priests dominate the field, control its
institutions, hold the gross of its capital, and thus represent orthodoxy. They dom-
inate the religious public by reproducing and slightly redirecting the general opin-
ion. Prophets are the heterodox counterparts of the priests. They contradict the "sys-
tem" within more or less the same rationality, but from "below", representing mar-
ginalized positions. Both, priests and prophets, share the interest in hegemony over
the field. Correspondingly, both partake in the logic of totalizing discourses, be this,
for example, the teleological harmony of a perfect market system or the one of a
perfect revolution.
The sorcerers on the religious field are allodox — they are not commensurable
with the priest's or the prophet's discourses and strategies. They respond —for mon-
ey — to the public's interest in magic cure. A corresponding position on the intel-
lectual field in general would be the one of, let's say, Dadaists or a post-modern
"going private" . 4 But this article has a special focus: the political relevance of intel-
lectuals among a politically active public. So, the sorcerer's position has to be de-
fined more narrowly. The sorcerer, then, is a collective actor on the intellectual field
that is not commensurable with the priest's and the prophet's positions. It does not
respond to the logic of the conflict between the two other actors. It can well rep-
resent certain interests of the public, but without creating parties or fellowships of
followers. Thus, it is not involved in the competition for lay followers. But the over-
all relationship of the intellectual field counts also for the sorcerers: the competition
for intellectual legitimacy, recognition and relevance.
In the present article, these ideal-typical actors on the intellectual field serve in
the present article as a general scheme of classification. However, it is focused on-
ly in the internal relations on the field. "Intellectual elites" have to be defined in the
context of overall social relations.
"Elite" is a counter-concept to "ruling class". However, the concept of "elite"
comprises still a notion of social position, if elites are defined as "groupings with
the positional privilege of power and with capability of decision." (Müller 2002:
350) But in difference to the concept of "ruling class", "elite" already presuppos-
es the legitimacy of rule. The concept embraces the "meritocratic ideal of perfect
election... Elites deserve it to rule." (Müller 2002: 349) This can be interpreted with
the Weberian concept of "domination" in difference to "power". Domination is
based on its recognition by the dominated, with other words: on "symbolic capi-
tal" (Bourdieu). The exertion of power does not need to recur to force. In the most
effective case, the dominated already carry the logic of domination embodied in
their "habitus". They tacitly tend to even anticipate the elite's moves. But the pow-
er of an elite is not the same all over society. Political elites, for example, do not
dominate economic relations as economic elites do, and vice versa. Especially un-
der conditions of social differentiation, elites are quite specific according to differ-
ent fields and sub-fields of society. It is different elites that dominate, for example,
governments or social movements. Both are elites, but in specific social positions
and fields of action.
In consequence, we can maintain the notion of social position and take the
function of symbolic capital into account, when we define "elite" as follows: Elites
are collective actors that have the power to determine decisions and actions of oth-
er actors on certain fields without being directly involved or exerting direct influ-
ence. Elites dominate specific fields of social practice.
The most common concept of an intellectual is a prominent, notorious figure
that produces in the fields of philosophy, humanities, literature, arts and so forth —
like for example Emile Zola, Bertold Brecht, Simone de Beauvoir, Theodor Adorno,
Mahatma Ghandi, Wole Soyinka, Gabriel García Márquez, Octavio Paz ... Intellec-
tuals are considered to be relatively free from the constraints of political and social
life. More narrowly, some hold that real intellectuals have to be critical towards the
status quo. Moreover, Gramsci (1972) distinguishes between traditional intellectu-
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als, near to the ruling "block", and organic intellectuals of the oppressed classes.
This distinction reminds that intellectuals are not completely free from social con-
straints.
In this article we shall set out from a broad definition of "intellectual". If only
critics of the status quo would be considered as real intellectuals, the perspective
would be too biased. In this broad sense, an intellectual is a person that produces
cultural goods that — in very different ways — reflect on social life and enjoy a cer-
tain public recognition.
But the intellectual production is not as directly involved in public affairs as, for
example, juridical or journalistic work can be. Humanities, social sciences and arts,
instead, gain their influence precisely by a marked independence from politics. The
strength of scientists, writers and artists rests in their being free from political in-
terests, being "pure", as Pierre Bourdieu puts it. If such an intellectual intervenes in
politics, he or she does it as an "attorney of the common weal." (Bourdieu 1993:
29) Relative independence of the intellectual field and a structure of its own is pre-
cisely the condition of its social significance. It is because they are recognizably in-
tellectuals (and not politicians), that intellectuals can grant or withdraw legitimacy
(symbolic capital) of other social actors and become relevant to the public.
In these social relations, cultural goods — knowledge, artifacts, institutions and
the like — can function as cultural capital (Bourdieu 1983), that triggers effects on
society and politics. Knowledge and symbols can become an instrument in the strug-
gle over the definition of common interest — a highly political issue. The more rele-
vant cultural capital becomes, the more it turns a factor of domination.
Where does relevance originate from? It is very much according to intellectual
self-understanding to say: 'Relevance derives from pertinence. If a theory is perti-
nent to resolve social problems, it will become relevant.' This is partly true. But it is
also true that much impertinent talk gains relevance only because of its affinity to
power positions in other fields (as politics or economy). The content of intellectual
discourse, obviously, differs according to the social position of the intellectuals and
to the fields of their compromise. Even subordinate intellectual practice can become
most relevant, if it intervenes in mobilization of collective actors, such as social move-
ments. In the end, the objective political value of the cultural capital owned by spex
cific intellectuals depends on their possibilities to invest it; in other words: it depends
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on its usefulness for political and other elites — be they ruling elites or leaders of op-
positional movements. If intellectuals become intellectual elites, or not, does not
only depend on the intellectuals themselves. It depends on other social factors, too.
Intellectual elites can be academics, educators, writers, artists, religious digni-
taries, and similar. But the term should be understood according to two variables:
production of relevant cultural goods and field-specific dominance. Intellectuals be-
come intellectual elites, as they produce such cultural goods that are sufficiently rel-
evant to the public and to other elites, in order for the intellectual to be granted a
position of dominance in a certain field. Thus, the intellectual elite can take a dom-
inant position in a specific field of social praxis: certain political scientists in foreign
policy, certain writers in the media, certain tenure track professors in humanities
etc. But they dominate these fields only as intellectuals. That is to say: by cultural
products such as knowledge, symbols, artifacts etc. They dominate by virtue of the
relative independence of the intellectual field from the fields that the intellectuals
are e ngaged in. Intellectuals as elites, on the other hand, are co-dependend from
other elites, such as governmental, bureaucratic, economic or social movement
elites. Thus, the independence of the intellectual field is being challenged and has
to be reinforced again — in order for the intellectual to remain relevant as intellec-
tual. Within the dynamics of this paradox, intellectual elites are involved in public
struggle for the definition of common interest, whatever position they may identi-
fy with (governmental or social movements). In this sense, "intellectual elites" turn
out to be intellectuals with relevant positions in society.
In correspondence to this approach, it makes sense to describe intellectual elites
according to ...
• their relative position in the overall social space,
• the characteristics of cultural capital (the special knowledge) of the different
groups and the conditions of its investment and realization,
• the relative position in the intellectual field, and ...
•
... and taking into account the specific struggles for positions within this field.
Such criteria serve to locate intellectuals within the overall social space in rela-
ion to other positions. At the same time, the ideal types serve to indicate the dy-
namics of the intellectual field as such.
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Priests of independence:
the liberal vanguard during the nineteenth century
Under the Spanish colonial empire the classic intellectual was the "letrado", the
"literate": a person schooled in theology, law, philosophy, literature or grammar,
according to thomistic ideas, and almost always a servant of Church and govern-
ment. Opposition by Catholic intellectuals — as bishop Bartolomé de las Casas — was
an exceptional case.
Independence became possible with large scale local merchants and export-
crop producers, claiming free business opportunities, technical modernization and
social autonomy, like civil marriage and non-Catholic schools. Their intellectual lib-
eralism was oriented in the USA and Europe, except of Spain.
In opposition to Spanish monarchical rule the liberal elites (and later the con-
servatives, too) where constitutionalists, but not necessarily democrats. (Sondrol
1993) Caudillismos was too a strong heritage. Rational liberal constitutionalism
merged up to a certain point with charismatic caudillismo and rendered authori-
tarian constitutionalism. Power concentrated on the executive, and many success-
ful attempts were made to lifelong "royal presidencies". 6 Nevertheless, the caudil-
lo-feature was much stronger among Catholic and conservative hacendados than
among urban liberals. This political juxtaposition was going to shape the intellec-
tual field for a long time. Independence revolutionized the intellectual field. Liber-
als made up the vanguard, and their intellectuals performed as politicians. The strong
identification of liberal intellectuals and liberal political power created a consider-
able force over against conservative letrados. The field polarized.
As politicians, or near to political power, the great majority of intellectuals —
conservative and liberals — had no problem to affirm "royal presidencies". Some
tended to more aristocratic forms of "elitocracy",' others to a constitutionalist vari-
ants But polarization went along clear lines: Conservatives maintained strong links
with the Catholic church and firm orientation in Spanish culture. Letrados, of course,
favored clerical control over public education. 9 But even under conservative rule,
liberals still realized their influence to some extent in public schooling. (Sánchez
1998) On the other hand, liberal initiatives succeeded in creating institutions of last-
ing significance. In Colombia, for example, they established the first national uni-
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versity and a school for mine engineering, in order to create patriotic technicians
and intellectuals with utilitarian ideals following Bantham. In Venezuela, 1877, the
first Instituto de Ciencias Sociales on the continent was founded. (González 1998:
27) During the 19 th century developed a juxtaposition between letrados and tech-
nocratic elites — a constellation that still is somewhat significant.
But the relationship to Europe and the USA was almost the same among lib-
erals and conservatives: Both tended to imitate models. Conservatives where ori-
ented in the Spanish Catholic heritage; liberals opted for French or Anglo-Saxon
philosophy and Protestantism.
Finally, the indigenous intellectuals ought to be mentioned. Meanwhile it is true
thaf indigenous people did not partake in official politics for almost 500 years of
colony and nation-state, there were indigenous leaders that interpreted their his-
tory in a political way and lead rebellions. 10 These men constitute a special position
on the intellectual field in Latin America. It has long been latent, but it gave rise to
a powerful intellectual reorientation on the brink of the 20th century and, again, to-
day.
The latency of indigenous intellectuals points towards a certain latency of the
intellectual field as such. As the limits between intellectuals and politicians were still
not quite marked, the field could not organize itself in a relatively independent way.
As a consequence, intellectuals were too closely identified with political actors.
Therefore, talking with adapted Weberian vocabulary, the liberals who had been
"prophets" before independence turned "priests" soon after. For the intellectual
field to crystallize as such, intellectuals had to become more professional.
Rise of the prophets: first half of the 20th century
During this period the Mexican revolution was an important datum for Latin Amer-
ican intellectuals. It marked the fact that Latin America had consolidated its inde-
pendence and created a political system of its own. Latin America could face Eu-
rope and the USA from this position. Mexico nationalized its oil production and in-
troduced a new cultural policy: Indigenismo was a way of being proud of indige-
nous roots and of mestizaje. The Mexican government underlined this with a kind
of cultural foreign policy, networking intellectuals and politicians on the continent.[ t
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All this took place in the climate of industrialization in the bigger countries of
the continent: Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Brazil, and — in lesser degree —
Colombia and Peru. The new industrial elite grew a strong competition to the old
oligarchy. Its influence triggered political liberalism. "Conspicuous consumption"
(Veblen) became a cultural strategy to underscore social power. (Gerdes 1994) Cul-
tural production — and with it intellectuals and artists — grew to be more and more
a part of market economy and subject to its constraints and opportunities. One of
the opportunities for intellectuals was a growing independence from official poli-
tics. At the same time politics turned more professional and democracy more for-
mal, even though the presidencies (and constitutions) did not lose their authoritar-
ian traits. Important for intellectual influence was that liberal elites secularized pol-
itics by cutting back the influence of the Catholic church. Industrialization gave rise
to a new social class: industrial workers, who build strong unions and communist
parties.
These organizations grew a third political force on the continent. Many intel-
lectuals — in a subordinate position among the middle class — tended to identify with
the working class, the subordinated of the whole society. 12 However, the most con-
sequential change for intellectuals might have been modernization of social life:
more free professions, newspapers, public debate and the foundation of liberal pub-
lic universities. A cultural elite of public opinion makers could begin to develop. Ac-
cordingly, intellectuals did not perform so much anymore as politicians or as their
counselors. They began to "pluralize" into many different professions and social
positions. The intellectual field acquired relative autonomy.
Public universities were of special significance for intellectuals. Since the 19th
century they had furthered liberal thought. Now they focused on rational social
planning. Social sciences and social work were installed as careers beginning with
the 1930ties (Chile, Mexico, Brazil) and booming in the 50ties (Caracas, Buenos
Aires, Mexico, Santiago de Chile, Bogotá, Santiago de Cuba, Lima). (González 1998:
31) Social sciences were conceived as a means to steer industrialization and mod-
ernization, but also to give account of Latin American identity. The faculties took
up questions like the situation of proletarians, peasants and indigenous people and
searched for autochthonous sources of Latin American culture. Conservatives coun-
tered with the foundation of Catholic universities, thus fostering a more formal con-
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servative intellectual elite, beyond the old image of the letrado. 13 The following po-
larization between universities remains effective on the intellectual field until today.
A scientific approach to society fit into official strategies for development. The
United Nations Commission on Latin America (CEPAL), founded in 1948, defined
the State as the motor of progress and launched programs of economic modern-
ization and development. Structural-functionalist sociology, during the 1950ties,
enriched this strategy with social know-how. But this line of technocratic approach
to social affairs barely started up in the fifties. It grew more important later on.
In the first half of the 20 th
 century, intellectuals began to "go social". That gave
rise not only to a boheme or to newspaper- and coffeehouse-debates. It identified,
orfthe long run, many intellectuals with different social movements. On one hand,
conservative intellectuals headed movements like the "cristeros" in Mexico that
launched between 1926 and 1929 a rebellion against the revolution. But left wing
movements, on the other hand, developed much more dynamics in the intellectu-
al field. Leon Trotzky died in Mexico among a strong Marxist movement with lead-
ing intellectuals in rank and file. One of them, Diego Rivera, merged in his mural
paintings modernization, socialism and the indigenous American roots into a vision
of a new Mexico and Latin America. On the intellectual field, indigenismo merged,
to a certain extent, with the affirmation of Latin American identity from "below",
as for example it happened with José Carlos Mariátegui in Peru. While, at that time,
indigenismo was still a movement of mestizos, it nevertheless gave an important
impulse for the later development of indigenous intellectuals.
The most important outcome of the first half of the 20th
 century was that last-
ing structures of the intellectual field in Latin America were formed. The intellectual
field as such became more structured and more visible in society, and intellectuals
developed an oppositional discourse of their own. The field polarized in left and right
wing, secular and catholic. At the same time, intellectuals became more profession-
al, more independent from official politics, more identified with social movements
and more engaged in public debate. They gained profile as intellectuals. Now, intel-
lectual "prophets" arose as a proper position of the intellectual field. The same counts
for the position of the sorcerer: To allow for the existence of specialists, who sell their
services, the field had to develop and generate intellectual professionals. Neverthe-
less, from the 1960ties to the '80ties the prophets dominated the intellectual field.
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Marxist prophets and technocratic priests: from the 1960ties to the'80ties
From 1959 onwards, the Cuban revolution set an important milestone for Latin
American intellectuals. It helped to spawn the new Latin American narrative, the-
ology of liberation, and dependencia-theory. Specially, the Cuba crisis produced an
original sense of universal significance in many Latin American intellectuals. 14 In any
case: on the continental level the Cuban revolution projected Marxism as a serious
alternative to "CEPALism" on the road to progress.
The 1960ties set important features: the juxtaposition of Marxism and CEPAL-
ism, dependencia-theory, and continuing modernization of state and society, spe-
cially the universities. This combination spawned the rise of independent intellec-
tual specialists.
For the situation between the 60ties and the 80ties, we will discuss three ex-
amples: Chile with a strong intellectual tradition, Colombia with a comparatively
weak intellectual field and conservative hegemony, and the rise of indigenous in-
tellectuals. These examples will be examined again with reference to the 1990ties.
Chile is one of the earliest countries in Latin America to modernize and devel-
op strong political parties with intellectual background. Early industrialization also
created a technological elite in the private sector. (Silva 1992; Puryear 1994)
Developmental politics in the 60ties — partly in response to the Cuban revolu-
tion — lead to the so called "revolution in freedom" of the Christian Democrats, be-
ginning in 1964. Most of the intellectuals to design politics of modernization were
drawn form international organizations such as CEPAL. Young Christian Democrat
intellectuals looked for combining technocracy with a Christian social ethics. On the
other hand, the socialist movement grew stronger among intellectuals, especially
in public universities and among social scientists. Silva (1992) distinguishes techno-
cratic and humanist intellectuals — the former mostly economists, the latter sociol-
ogists. During the period between 1964 and 1973 both shared a growing skepti-
cism towards (early) economicist modernization-theory. On the brink of the 1970ties,
dependencia-theory (Cardoso/Faletto 1969) swept the intellectual scene. Prime
themes — even before the government of Salvador Allende — were "anti-imperial-
ism, national liberation, struggle against the oligarchy, and the socio-political inte-
gration of the masses" (Silva 1992: 147). As the labor market for intellectuals ex-
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panded, many of them began to work in free research institutions, public adminis-
tration and planning, political parties and in the media. They gained still more in-
dependence and influence in society.
Towards the end of the 60ties the polarization among the intellectuals became
more and more visible. It coincided with the polarization between public and Catholic
universities. At the Catholic University of Chile the gremialistas movement was found-
ed as a Christian response to the left. Later on, this movement agglutinated im-
portant social forces to overthrow the government of Allende.
Under the Unidad Popular (1970-73), however, humanist, left oriented sociol-
ogists gained an important influence on the political elites, on governmental poli-
tics and on social movements. The role of sociologists was redefined "in terms of
theoretical and political militancy in favor of the revolution" (Silva 1992: 149). Con-
sequently there has been a certain tendency for the intellectual elites "to gain in
political audience what they lost in professional profile" 1 5 — a self-criticism pro-
nounced by many engaged intellectuals after the military coup. However, the time
of the Unidad Popular in government was too short to put Marxist intellectuals in
the priest's position on the intellectual field.
The dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet between 1973 and 1989 re-structured
the intellectual field by violence. Left wing intellectuals were killed, tortured, re-
pressed and exiled. During the first year, integrist Christian intellectuals of the gremi-
alista movement and the Catholic University proved low capacity in economic mat-
ters. So the neo-liberal "Chicago Boys" took over in 1975 and turned quickly into
the new orthodoxy on the intellectual field. By governmental order they began to
dictate economic and social policy until the 1990ties in a hegemonic way. They pri-
vatized economy thoroughly and reduced politics to an exclusive matter of the state.
Public affairs were run either by economic measures or by military repression. Their
discourse legitimized dictatorship for the sake of — the keyword: — efficient eco-
nomic policy, and to the sacrifice of political democracy.
During the 1980ties the remaining humanist intellectuals could organize in pri-
vate research institutes, much of them funded by international cooperation. The ex-
iled social scientists fostered their professional education in European universities.
They developed into an extraordinary and reasonably independent scientific elite.
Both elements were of great significance for Chile's return to democracy in the
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1990ties and for the development of a position on the intellectual field, specific for
the independent specialist, the "sorcerer".
Chile, from the 1960ties to the late '80ties, is a very clear cut example for the
ongoing differentiation of intellectual elites: traditional Catholics, humanist sociol-
ogist with Marxist heritage, and economicist technocrats. The most important trait
of this period all over Latin America is the confrontation between leftist intellectu-
al and oligarchic power elites. The intellectual field, however, was developing its
own shape. The orthodox position was held by neo-liberals and traditionalist Catholics,
and the heterodox by (exiled) Marxists and some Catholics. The sorcerer's position
was about to rise.
The second example, Colombia, shows also a strong political polarization.
(Sánchez 1993 and 1998) Towards the end of the so called violencia-period, between
1948 and 1965, a rapid modernization equipped the public universities with social
scientists, who investigated violencia and focused themes of the time: Marxism and
developmentalism. But swiftly, the pursuit of social change boiled down to a quest
of power again. Left wing intellectuals —for example the priest Camilo Torres — co-
operated with the guerrilla movement, meanwhile traditionalists did not enter into
public debate, but encouraged the oligarchy's repression of protest with a state of
siege in 1978. Only in 1984 president Belisario Betancourt initiated a National Dia-
logue. In this process the strongly marginalized humanist intellectuals took an im-
portant role and gave rise to new developments on the intellectual field as well.16
Heavy polarization of the intellectual field conditioned also the rise of indige-
nous intellectual elites. Indigenous peoples partly identified with guerrilla move-
ments (for example ORPA in Guatemala). But in the end, their interests were not
furthered to their satisfaction, because of the authoritarian cadre structure of the
guerrillas and the violent military reaction.
The period between the 1940ties and '80ties, nevertheless, was important for
indigenous movements. At its beginning, they were still quite much under tutelage
of mestizo intellectuals and remained objects of integrative programs. But on the
long run, this gave rise to an indigenous petty bourgeoisie and to representative or-
ganizations. 17
 In consequence, some constitutions (like Guatemala 1985) take the
ethnic condition into account and grant cultural self determination, local legislation
and territories. 19 Most important: this era facilitates formal education for indige-
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nous intellectuals. So, after the cease of war, the 1990ties came to be an important
period of indigenous activism. Today, indigenous intellectuals constitute a consid-
erable position on the intellectual field in many countries. In most cases they are in
the position of the sorcerer.
The period from the 1960ties to the 80ties showed a strong polarization be-
tween orthodox and heterodox positions. The role of the priest generally was filled
by technocratic neo-liberal or by conservative intellectuals; the one of the prophets
by Marxists or humanists. Most interesting is the development of a third position
represented by independent professional intellectuals and the indigenous move-
ment.
Pragmatic sorcerers: the 1990ties and after
The 1990ties began with a political hangover. Neo-liberal technocrats in Chile, for
example, had to cope with the disappearance of Pinochet from the presidential
palace (1989). But the left suffered more: Important revolutionary movements (El
Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru) and the Nicaraguan revolution had been
suffocated or had turned evidently criminal. Perhaps the most important setback
was the fact that Nicaraguan revolutionary leadership had not proved resistant to
corruption. On the other hand, democratic processes in the 1990ties opened new
opportunities for intellectual action. While priests and prophets still were struggling
with each other, the sorcerer's time had come.
In this sense, Chile was specially favored, since the dictatorship had not been
able to disarticulate the intellectuals completely. A humanist intellectual elite had
become very professional and relevant during the 1980ties. Social scientists pre-
pared together with politicians the referendum against Pinochet in 1989. Many in-
tellectuals came back from exile and engaged in the democratic process without
merging again into a symbiotic relationship with the state or political parties. (Silva
1992: 156) Many of them maintained their jobs in free institutions and served as
consultants. Former Marxist intellectuals began to revalue democracy. Neo-liberal
technocrats suffered a loss of influence as even Christian democratic intellectuals
began to oppose them. 19
 A considerable number of humanists and technocrats fi-
nally merged into pragmatic politics.
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Although the overall economic program stayed quite neo-liberal, public poli-
tics had a strong comeback. Over against economic efficiency justice, law, politics,
and social security gained new significance for government again. On the other
hand, political discourse of left wing intellectuals lost its focus on inner-societal con-
tradictions and class struggle. Silva (1992: 160) reports that terms like 'el pueblo',
'working class', 'the marginalized', 'class struggle' are being substituted by 'citi-
zenship', 'population', 'sustainable growth', 'financial stability', 'modernity'.
This corresponds to a general shift away from totalizing ideologies to pragmatic
strategies. (González 1998: 39 ff.) Carlos Sojo, director for Costa Rica of the Latin
American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), underscores that social sciences in
Latin America point towards more professional skill. This is the way, he adds, to take
the official disenchantment with economics as an opportunity for sociology and so-
cial politics to come back into policy planning (Interview 28.2.2003) — or, as Silva
(1992: 154) puts it, to be "more professional and less messianic".
A similar process took place in Colombia. After president Betancur had pro-
claimed a general amnesty for the guerrilla (1982) and a National Dialogue (1984),
many intellectuals began to change their image of the Colombian society; and with
the constitution of 1991 a broad cooperation of critical intellectuals in government
and official politics began to develop. Today, even Gabriel García Márquez is de-
signing a nation wide educational program together with the ministry of education.
Two peace-commissions were an important milestone for intellectuals to criti-
cally participate and take a lead in official politics. (Sánchez 1993) The commission's
reports have been published in 1987 and 1992. The cooperation of the intellectu-
als focused on different forms of violence and possibilities for negotiation (1987),
as well as on the relationship between the state and the guerrilla movement. The
reports point to strengthening civil society, not the state. Specially, the second re-
port was communicated to the public by regional workshops. It triggered grass-root
political participation and proposals about agrarian reform, a social contract with
demobilized guerrillas, conversion of coca plantations, and much more. Sánchez
(1993: 44) underlines that one of the most important results was, to show that con-
flicts are part of ordinary life and have to be regulated by the society itself in a civ-
ilized way. 20 This corresponds precisely to the role of conflict in a modern society
(Senghaas 1998: 32) — difficult to grasp for totalizing theories.
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The indigenous movement and its intellectuals mobilized in the 1980ties and
90ties throughout a critical dispute with left and right wing positions, prophets and
priests. Indigenous intellectuals had higher education during the 1970ties and 80ties.
They transformed indigenismo into an authentically indigenous movement.
In Guatemala, during the early 1980ties, the movement was first to some ex-
tent linked to the guerrilla. But already at that time discussions about the ethnic na-
ture of a revolutionary state were controversial. After democratization, the move-
ment took more and more its own shape. Its middle class intellectual elite put much
attenti9n on cultural identity. This had immediate political effect. In 1995 some in-
digenous organizations created their own platform for the presidential elections.
(Weisshar: 2000)
In Ecuador the indigenous movement made much headway with the rebellion
in 1990. Since then it is an important actor in national politics. The current presi-
dent of the country governs on the basis of the indigenous vote.
It is important to see that the indigenous movement pronounces claims that
question deeply the political identity of Latin American republics. Many branches of
the movement do not simply focus on a revitalization of indigenous culture, but on
political presence in transformed nations. One of the most popular concepts has
been Lenin's idea of the multi-national state. As Ibarra (1999: 86) notes, the vast
majority of the Ecuadorian political elite does not share into this concept. The same
is true for other countries. Nevertheless, indigenous intellectuals are making their
way into politics and onto the university chairs. 21 They differentiate even more the
intellectual field and they diversify social conflicts. The indigenous movement, in
this sense, is an expression of an open and conflictive modernity; not so much of
traditional society.
All three examples indicate an important shift in Latin American intellectual
performance. Conflict is not seen anymore as an antecedent of some utopian har-
mony, but simply as a constant condition of a politicized society. As for social sci-
ences, González (1998) traces this development back to dependencia-theory (ac-
cording to Cardoso and Faletto). The former grand-theories — developmentalism
and orthodox Marxism — both have worked with the distinction between tradition-
al and modern society. They shared a positivistic epistemology and a teleological
concept of change. As underdevelopment was shown to be an inherent condition
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of capitalism, a conscience of historical contingency turned the positivistic and tele-
ological concepts obsolete. Overall historical processes toward utopic horizons lost
their appeal. Instead, during the last thirty years social sciences began to focus more
and more on particular actors, for example: Freire and the pedagogic of the op-
pressed, Fals Borda and indigenous knowledge, Martín-Baró and the social psy-
chology of war. The catalog of themes changed towards issues as identity, reform
of the state, industrial politics, poverty, social politics, the rural condition etc. And
the actors on the intellectual field diversified.
The growing social differentiation of Latin American societies during the last
decades also shapes today's intellectual field in many ways.
First, it pushed in disadvantage of the "giants". Top cultural figures lost much
of their significance. Novelists like Gabriel García Márquez or Mario Vargas Llosa
may still be significant for politics. But — as the Chilean writer Tatiana Lobo puts it
— their voice as the moral consciousness of society is being less listened to in the
public. Additionally the writer's guild, as a whole, suffers pressure from the editor-
ial houses for mass-public productions with low political and cultural profile. (In-
terview 26.2.2003) Moreover, former political "giants" (as el pueblo unido) dis-
solved into a large variety of "dwarfs" in civil society. New forms of political repre-
sentation and intellectual influence on politics developed. (García 1995: 28) Most
important: the number of actors, positions, interests, relations, and coalitions in-
creases notably.
The following diagram shows intellectual actors according to their position in
social space. It relates political capital with cultural capital to construct the space it-
self. The scale-value of cultural capital derives from its relevance (a product of use-
fulness for problem solving and public recognition). The value of political capital de-
rives from influence on political decisions and processes. Along these variables the
diagram constructs the social space. As a basic orientation it depicts some positions
of the general "class structure" with corresponding career expectations. On this ba-
sic scheme, the graph projects the distribution of important intellectual actors with
respect to political power: university types, movements (like Human Rights) in dis-
tinction from their intellectuals. Further, the diagram distinguishes and relates the
spheres of professional, traditional catholic and movement intellectuals. Finally, there
is an attempt to locate the ideal types of the intellectual field within the frame of
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society as a whole: priest, prophet and sorcerer. The graph will not be fully inter-
preted here. It is not the result of a quantitative correlational analysis, but of an over-
all estimation. However, it might help to place most of our considerations within a
broader social context.
Social movement intellectuals: 	 _ indigenous, _ unionist, _ecologist, _ women, _ prof. asociations
C	 . p cl	
.0111st1	 ...restrained by structural change
Professional intellectuals 	 __, .... _ Social movements --- Indigenous mavm.	 Trad. Catholic
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Intellectuals diversify into NGOs, social movement organizations, corporations,
consultancy firms, media, arts, research institutes and, of course, universities and
governments. Obviously there will develop new power relationships, new opportu-
nities to mobilize resources by cooperation and new frontlines on the intellectual
field.22
Social movements are of growing political significance. The sheer number of
different action groupings shows the actual differentiation of collective action into
diverse interests as well as the social weight of the phenomenon as a whole: women's
movement, indigenous, Afro-American, anti-globalization movements, unions, em-
ployers associations, micro-enterprise networks, professional associations, religious
groups with political agendas, human rights activists, the ecology movement ... and
may be more. 23 All these organizations mobilize politically and offer a field of ac-
tion for intellectuals. With reference to political capital, the movements are located
in the lower sphere, while some of its intellectuals might have special influence due
to their professional position, for example, as a professor at a public university. In
terms of cultural capital, most movements and their intellectuals appear with quite
a high position. They address issues of social significance and even achieve to mo-
bilize public behind them. Thus, the proper intellectuals of the movement sphere
appear to be the "prophets". But also sorcerers can be counted under movement
influence. The main contradiction on the field exists between movement intellec-
tuals and those near to the upper positions, as economists, private business school
professors, media commentators etc. — "priests" according to the model. A second
important contradiction prevails over against traditional intellectuals, mostly in close
relation to Catholic social teaching. In a certain sense, this contradiction is the her-
itage of the old juxtaposition between the Catholic letrado and the secularized lib-
eral thinker. But it loses significance for society. Instead, the contradiction between
social movements and neo-liberal technocrats becomes more important. "Sorcer-
ers" appear to be in a medium position that offers opportunities to mediate and,
thus, gain social relevance. A third area of multiple contradictions opens between
different movements, for example: ecologists and unionists, indigenous and femi-
nist movement. The prophets of each movement normally are too much caught
within the movement's interest, to be able to find solutions. This is another field for
mediation by independent intellectual specialists. On the other hand, professional-
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ization of intellectuals bears the seed of conflict with social movements, too. A
movement intellectual sees many interests and strategies of "his" or "her" move-
ment with different eyes, once he or she arrived at a university chair.
Among the universities the traditional competence between Catholic and pub-
lic institutions stays quite similar. While it is very difficult to score the difference in
political capital between these two types of universities, it seems quite obvious that
the philosophers lost significance over against social scientists during the last decades.
New actors on the academic field are private universities of very different scale and
quality, but in a great number. The most important private institutes in Latin Amer-
ican are continental networks of, roughly speaking, neo-liberal orientation, as for
ex'Ample INCAE (Costa Rica and other countries), a fellow institution of Harvard Busi-
ness School. These institutions focus on a straight forward education of intellectu-
al business elites according to a technocratic style. Given the close relationship to
business capital and the orientation of many Latin American governments during
the last decade or two, these schools hold much political capital and represent a
"priestly" position on the intellectual field. The typical intellectual here is the polit-
ically active economist. But most of the private universities do not qualify for the
subject of this article.
Many more aspects could be discussed, as for example the role of the media.
In any case, the most important trait of the intellectual field in Latin America, to-
day, is functional differentiation within obvious power relations. Both frame the op-
portunities and constraints of today's intellectuals engaging in politics.
How do these intellectuals face the present conditions of power and social dif-
ferentiation? As for power, Inacio "Lula" da Silva, the new president of Brazil and
leader of the Workers Party (PT), reportedly was told the following by a member of
the Brazilian business elite: "Power is like a violin. You take it up with the left and
play it with the right." Things are more complex. The governments of "Lula" in
Brazil, of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and of Alejandro Toledo are not simply "left".
What they have in common is regionalism, or more to the point: a nationalism open
to regional interests. According to Arnoldo Mora, Lula and Toledo modified their
relationship with the bourgeoisie of their countries in order to develop national and
regional programs against the economic domination of the USA and for more so-
cial justice. 24
 The situation in Venezuela features more of caudillismo and little so-
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cial consent, but for the rest it is comparable. Mexico, on the other hand, does not
develop straight forward neo-liberal policies under Fox, and searched for more com-
promise with the Zapatista guerrilla than the PRI government did. In other words:
political power is not as one-handed as it was during the 1970ties and the 8oties.
It cannot be dealt with by totalizing theories.
In a similar way, the one-handed neo-liberal model of mere economic growth,
as a means to eradicate poverty and inequality, proved wrong. It coincided too much
with age old politics of Latin American power elites, who have been unable to de-
velop even decent democracies, because of their unwillingness to contribute to pub-
lic income. 25 The economicist approach to development has come to an end. To-
day even the World Bank considers political cooperation with social organizations
in polycentric development coalitions as an interesting alternative.
In this situation, a group of humanist intellectuals26 took the initiative to cre-
ate a policy proposal, the so called "Buenos Aires Consensus" 27 . This paper assumes
the condition of a global market economy. But within this framework it proposes
to build up social and economic alliances and to facilitate political participation of
citizen-movements, in order to guarantee economic growth with equity and, thus,
to strengthen representative democratic institutions. The struggle against poverty
and inequality as well as the reformation of government are key tasks of the pro-
gram.
For the orthodox left such a program might mean — as a journalist puts it — "to
swallow toads for the 21st century" (Spielmann 1999). Instead, Jorge Castañeda —
a leading member of the group, distinguished intellectual, and ex-minister of for-
eign affairs in Mexico — believes that the main challenge lies in pragmatic politics:
the combination of "left programmatic theses" with the struggle for power to in-
fluence politics within the actual framework.28
The point is, to find the balance between a necessary power-play, on one hand,
and politics that are oriented in social participation, on the other. Such an approach
is not entirely new in Latin America. But it still challenges old vices of Latin Ameri-
can politics. First, the approach does not seek power for the sake of power; so it de-
nies the traditional absolutistic style of government. Second, it defines democracy
as the common participation in public affairs; so it disapproves the authoritarian
character of the presidential system and its constitutions. Third, it allows for chang-
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ing coalitions and dissenting; so it overcomes personalistic caudillismo. Fourth, the
approach focuses on feasible contents and objectives; so it rejects utopias of any
kind, left or right. In the end, the proposal modernizes the political processes in Latin
America, with an important ingredient of social justice and political participation.
Modernization means to open up the political processes to the arena of con-
flicting social interests. Time has gone by for "democratic kings" and caudillos to
rule traditional societies by suffocating potential social conflict. Conflicts are part of
the "fundamental politization" of society in modern age, as Dieter Senghaas (1998:
32) underlines. Traditional philosophies conceive of society as a closed and harmo-
nious order. Thus, conflict is seen as chaos and has to be stifled in order to restitute
harfnony. Both, conservative and left utopians strive for this kind of harmony: The
former search for it in the past, the latter in the future. But both views are pre-mod-
em. Modern "fundamental politization" means that conflict drives society itself and
has to be regulated by political means.
This involves many actors. Intellectual expertise can engage on many levels. Its
relevance depends on the paradox of intellectual elites. On one hand, they have to
be pertinent and useful for those engaged directly in politics; on the other hand,
their judgment has to be independent. In the end, both depend on a strongly de-
veloped intellectual field that facilitates relatively autonomous intellectual positions.
In any case, the regulation of constitutive conflict in fundamentally politicized
societies is not a business for intellectual priests behind a throne, nor the one for
intellectual prophets with a flaming sword. It is a job for intelligent and reflexive
mediators, who feed their knowledge and critique into political processes and stay
as "independent as possible" 29
 - just as the sorcerer does. The challenges are de-
manding, so that even a little magic might be welcome.
Annotations
The task was to give an overview on the Latin American situation under similar
premises. It is a hazardous enterprise to outline two hundred years of intellec-
tual engagement in political affairs on a whole continent. So I apologize at this
point for being very brief and rather schematic. Many interesting details cannot
be considered.
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2 Quoted according to Sondrol (1993: 59)
3 A general assessment of Latin American social thought in Werz 1992.
4 See Urrego (1996) who shows different currents in intellectual responses to the ap-
pearance of the EPR-guerrilla in Mexico during the mid-nineties. While there was
a broad and very diverse response, the postmodern intellectuals didn't say a word.
5 For example for the 19th century José Gaspar Rodríguez (Paraguay) and Juan
Manuel de Rosas (Agentina); in the 20th century Juan Perón (Argentina), Getúlio
Vargas (Brasil) and in a certain sense as well Fidel Castro.
6 Monarchies in Brazil (Don Pedro I and II) and Mexico (Iturbide and Maximiliano);
Bolivia: Bolívar as "consul" vitalicio; en Paraguay Dr. Francia; Haiti: monarchy
and lifelong presidencies.
7 So did the early liberators Simón Bolívar (gran Colombia, Bolivia) and José de
San Martín (Argentina, Chile, Perú), but also liberal intellectuals like José Enrique
Rodó (1871-1917, Uruguay).
e As for example the Argentinian sociologist and lawyer Juan Bautista Alberdi
(1810-1884): "Give any possible power to the executive, but do it through a
constitution." (Quoted after Sondrol 1993: 60)
9 ... a program that could be maintained quite rigorously under strong conserva-
tive regimes until the first decades of the 20th century, for example in Colom-
bia. (Sánchez 1998)
10 Only to mention Guatemala: Tecún Uman against Alvarado at the very brink of
the colonial era; 1708 a revolt in Chiapas, 1770 Cobán y Rabinal, 1813 San
Martín Cuchumatanes, 1820 in Totonicapán lead by the indigenous intellectu-
al Anastasio Tzul, 1898 in San Juan Ixcoy, and 1944 in Patzicia.
Among other things, this served to counteract the US initiative of a Pan-Amer-
ican union under US-leadership with the own enterprise of a "Latin American
Union". (Yankelevitch 1996)
12 ... according to the homology between two different, but equally subordinat-
ed positions in two different fields, as Bourdieu (1992: 282 f.) shows.
13 For example the Universidad Javeriana in Colombia that countered the Escuela
Normal Superior, a liberal institution according to the model of the french Ecole
Normale Superieur. (Sánchez 1998) As for Latin American universities in gener-
al see Ruiz 1995.
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14 So the former Costa Rican minister of culture, the philosopher Arnoldo Mora,
(Interview 24.2.2003)
15 Brunner (1988: 81), quoted according to Silva (1992: 149).
16 See below, on the 1990ties and later.
17 See Ibarra (1999) for Ecuador and Weisshar (2000) for Guatemala. In more gen-
eral terms Colombres (1993). An overview with more literature in Melgar (2003).
1e From an indigenous perspective see Chavajay (2000).
19 According to Silva, technocratic intellectuals divided into a "oficialistas" and a
"disidentes" fraction already during dictatorship.
20 On most recent developments see Archila (2002)
21 
`See for the actual situation as well Barrera (2002).
22 A nice satirical counterfeit of the new intellectual field is given by Hopenhayn
(2001).
23 On social movements in Latin America see Nueva Sociedad (2002).
24 Interview 24.2.2003. "Lula" obtained even support of the Sao Paulo business
elite, because of his policy against the free trade agreement with the USA that
would weaken considerably Brazilian capital.
25 See in this line of critique Joseph Stieglitz during his recent visit to Colombia (La
Nación, Costa Rica, 7.3.03). Argentina is only the most visible example of ship-
wrecked local elite and IMF policies. See with more detail Korzeniewicz /Smith
2000.
26 Jorge Castañeda, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Leonel Brizola, Manuel Camacho,
Dante Caputo, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, Vicente Fox, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva,
Sergio Ramírez and Vicentinho.
27 ... designed as a counterproposal to the "Washington Consensus" of the IMF
and adopted by the Socialist International in June 1999; see Internacional So-
cialista (1999).
28 Castañeda (2001). This former left wing intellectual presented a widely discussed
analysis about the Latin American left (Castañeda 1993). He came to be a sym-
bolic figure for the new intellectual current in search of pragmatic and human-
ist alternatives.
29 Caballero (2000: 79) for the Colombian context.
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